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Employee Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a treble-damage remedy to 
"any person who shall be injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."1 Although private 
actions filed under this section play a major enforcement role in the 
federal antitrust laws,2 lower courts have diverged widely in answer-
ing the threshold question of which parties have standing to main-
tain a section 4 action.3 Even in the wake of two recent Supreme 
Court decisions in this area,4 the law of antitrust standing remains 
"something less than a seamless web."5 
This Note will focus on the confusion that plagues one category 
of antitrust standing cases, those in which an employee alleges 
wrongful discharge for his refusal to participate in a scheme that vio-
I. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 
(Supp. V 1981)). Section 4 provides: 
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the 
district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the 
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the 
_ cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The original version of§ 4 superseded § 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 210 
(1890). Section 7 of the Sherman Act was repealed as redundant in 1955. Act of July 7, 1955, 
ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 282, 283. 
2. In fiscal 1980, 1,475 private antitrust actions were filed, compared to 78 government 
cases (39 civil and 39 criminal) during the same period. The number of private filings is there• 
fore about 19 times that of government filings. See Ao. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 1980 ANNUAL 
REPORT 63, table 22. For almost two decades, the total number of antitrust suits has grown at a 
rate of about 9% per year. Because the number of cases brought by federal agencies has re• 
mained almost constant, however, this growth is almost wholly attributable to the increase in 
the number of private filings. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 533-34 (2d ed. 
1981). 
3. See cases cited in note 7 infra; see generally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frame-
work for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L. J. 809 (1977); Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots: 
Complications and Co,iflicts on Standing to Sue and Causation Under Section 4 of the ClaJ·lon 
Act, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 351 (1971); Lytle & Purdue,Anlitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of 
the Clayton Act: JJeterminalion of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 AM. 
U. L. REv. 795 (1976); Page,Anlitrusl JJamages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach lo Anti-
trust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 467 (1980); Sherman, Anll1rust Standing: From Loeb lo 
Malamod, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374 (1976); Note, Standing to Sue for Treble JJamages Under 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 570 (1964); Comment, Standing Under Clay-
ton§ 4: A Proverbial Mystery, 17 DICK. L. REv. 73 (1972). 
4. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 
897 (1983) (denying § 4 standing to labor union); Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465 
(1982) (group health plan subscriber had standing to seek treble damages under § 4), 
5. Warner Management Consultants, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 961 (N.D. 
Ill. 1982) ("In fact, as we have had occasion to observe previously, this area of the law is rife 
with 'doctrinal confusion.'") (citing In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 393, 401 
(N.D. Ill. 1979)). 
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!ates the antitrust laws.6 Conflicts among the circuits in their analy-
sis and resolution of these employee standing cases7 have not been 
definitively settled by the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements 
on the right to seek recovery under section 4. This Note argues that 
these recent Supreme Court decisions, as well as the policies behind 
the antitrust laws, weigh in favor of permitting an employee to main-
tain a section 4 action against his employer if he is discharged for 
refusing to participate in an operation that violates the antitrust laws. 
Part I of this Note discusses the general parameters of the right to 
section 4 recovery, emphasizing the Supreme Court's recent formula-
tion of these parameters. Part II suggests that when these antitrust 
standing criteria are properly applied to the factual context in which 
most employee standing cases arise, an employee discharged for re-
fusing to participate in an antitrust scheme has standing to seek 
treble damages under section 4. 
I. GENERAL PARAMETERS OF SECTION 4 RECOVERY 
A. Purposes of and Requirements for Section 4 Recovery: An 
Overview 
In enacting section 4 of the Clayton Act, Congress created a pri-
vate antitrust enforcement mechanism that employs two primary ap-
proaches. First, the potency of the treble-damage remedy seeks to 
deter potential antitrust violators from pursuing unlawful schemes. 8 
Second, where deterrence fails, the treble-damage remedy forces vio-
6. This Note will assume throughout that employee discharge or termination encompasses 
the less frequent situation where an employee is not actually terminated by his employer but is 
"forced" to resign. See notes 72-74 infra and accompanying text. 
1. Compare Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and re-
manded mem., 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983) (former marketing director who alleged forced resigna-
tion by employer and blacklisting by employer's co-conspirators because of his refusal to 
cooperate with conspiracy had standing to seek § 4 recovery), and Shaw v. Russell Trucking 
Line, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (truckdriver who alleged termination by employer 
for his refusal to participate in antitrust conspiracy had § 4 standing), with Bichan v. Cheme-
tron Corp., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983) (former corporate 
president who alleged termination by employer and blacklisting by industrial gas industry for 
his refusal to cooperate with conspiracy had no standing to seek § 4 recovery), McNulty v. 
Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (unit sales manager who alleged discharge for 
refusing to engage in activities that allegedly violated the antitrust laws had no § 4 standing), 
Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (sales managers who alleged 
discharge for active opposition to employer's allegedly discriminatory pricing policy had no 
§ 4 standing), Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (employee 
who alleged retaliatory dismissal for refusal to engage in allegedly anticompetitive practices 
had no § 4 standing ), and Booth v. Radio Shack Div. Tandy Corp., 1982-83 Trade Cas. 
~ 65,001 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (employee who alleged termination for refusing to carry out policies 
that allegedly violated the Robinson-Patman Act had no § 4 standing). 
8. See Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. 
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) ("the purposes of the antitrust laws are best 
served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone con-
templating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws"). See generally, Berger & Bern-
stein, supra note 3, at 845-46 ( citing supportive legislative history). 
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lators to disgorge the fruits of their ill-gotten gains, while amply 
compensating the victims of the antitrust violation.9 
The Supreme Court has emphasized these two main goals of sec-
tion 4's private enforcement scheme - deterrence and compensation 
- in determining who may recover treble damages under that sec-
tion.10 In making this threshold determination, the Court has recog-
nized two analytically distinct requirements for the existence of a 
section 4 private right of action: 11 An antitrust plaintiff must allege 
"antitrust injury" and he must also establish that he has "antitrust 
standing."12 
The antitrust "injury" requirement is mandated by the language 
of section 4 itself. Specifically, an antitrust plaintiff must allege in-
jury to his "business or property" occasioned "by reason of anything 
9. See Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) ("Congress sought to create a 
private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of 
their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust viola-
tions."); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 & n.10 (1976), See 
generally Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 845-86 (citing supportive legislative history). 
10. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465,473 (1982) ("[l]n the absence of some 
articulable consideration of statutory policy suggesting a contrary conclusion in a particular 
factual setting, we have applied § 4 in accordance with its plain language and its broad reme-
dial and deterrent objectives."); American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel 
Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 569 (1982) ("In this case, we can honor the statutory purpose [of the 
antitrust laws] best by interpreting the antitrust private cause of action to be at least as broad 
as a plaintiff's right to sue for analogous torts, absent indications that the antitrust laws are not 
intended to reach so far.") (citations omitted); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343-44 
(1979) (Because § 4 was primarily conceived as opening the door of justice to individuals and 
giving ample damages to injured parties, the legislative history supports a holding that "a 
consumer deprived of money by reason of allegedly anticompetitive conduct is injured in 
'property'" within the meaning of that section.); cf. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cali-
fornia State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 905-06 (1983) (although legislative history 
supports broad construction of§ 4, a proper interpretation of this remedial provision cannot 
"ignore the larger context in which the entire statute was debated"; this larger context reveals 
the Congressional assumption that various co=on-law limitations would apply to antitrust 
damages litigation). 
Although the Court did not preface its analysis in Associated General with a recitation of 
the broad remedial purposes of§ 4, the Court was nonetheless concerned with upholding that 
section's private enforcement function. However, where this function could be performed by 
an "identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate 
the public interest in antitrust enforcement," the Court found little justification for allowing 
"more remote" parties to assume the same private attorney-general role. 103 S. Ct. at 911. See 
also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977). 
11. See Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 473-77 (1982); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 
431 U.S. 720, 728 n.7 (1977) ("[T]he question of which persons have been injured by an illegal 
overcharge for purposes of§ 4 is analytically distinct from the question of which persons have 
sustained injuries too remote to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4."). 
12. Although the analytical distinction between the two concepts has been explicitly recog-
nized by the Court, see note 11 supra, the Court has not uniformly required discrete inquiries 
with regard to antitrust standing and antitrust injury. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. 
California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 904-13 (1983) (Court conducted single 
inquiry as to whether party was "a person injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws 
within the meaning of§ 4 of the Clayton Act."); Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 481-
84 (1982) (as part of antitrust "standing" analysis, Court incorporated clarified concept of anti-
trust "injury"); notes 16 & 47-67 infra and accompanying text. 
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forbidden in the antitrust laws."13 The "business or property" lan-
guage underscores the fact that section 4 provides redress only for 
pecuniary loss, 14 while the words ''by reason of' have been construed 
as a restriction on the kinds of pecuniary losses that are cognizable 
under section 4.15 The Supreme Court has defined this universe of 
cognizable antitrust injury to encompass only "injury of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that 
which makes defendants' acts unlawful."16 The Court, in clarifying 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981); see note 1 supra. For § 4 purposes, "antitrust laws" 
include the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 
(1976)), §§ 73-76 of the Wilson Tariff Act, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894), and the Act amending 
the Wilson Tariff Act, ch. 40, 37 Stat. 667 (1913) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 
(1976)), and the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Excluded from 
the meaning of the term "antitrust laws" for § 4 purposes are § 3 of the Robinson-Patman 
Antidiscrimination Act, ch. 592, § 3, 49 Stat. 1526, 1528 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) 
(1976)) and§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). See Nashville Milk Co. v. 
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958) (definition of antitrust laws contained at 15 U.S.C. § 12 is 
exclusive for purposes of 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 & 26, permitting private actions for injuries resulting 
from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws); cf. Paul M. Harrod Co. v. A.B. Dick Co., 194 
F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ohio 1961) (a judgment or decree entered in connection with an antitrust 
case filed by the government is not an "antitrust law" within the purview of§ 4 and a private 
party may not recover for violation of such judgment or decree). 
14. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1978) (construing injury to "business 
or property" to encompass monetary injury to consumers arising directly out of retail 
purchases); cf. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972) ("business or property" 
refers to "co=ercial interests or enterprises" and not to "general damages" to state's 
economy). 
15. See generally Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 810-13; Page, supra note 3, at 497. 
16. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (emphasis 
added). In Brunswick, respondents, three bowling centers, complained that petitioner's acqui-
sition of several financially troubled bowling centers violated§ 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), by lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly. In 
seeking treble damages, however, respondents sought to prove that their profits would have 
increased had petitioners allowed the acquired centers to close, thereby reducing competition 
within the market. Thus, respondents sought to recover treble damages for injury suffered as a 
result ofthepro-competitive effects of petitioner's acquisitions. The Court found that allowing 
such recovery would have been "inimical to the purposes of [the antitrust] laws." Respondents 
could not recover merely by showing that their loss occurred "by reason of' the unlawful 
acquisitions; they had to show that their loss occurred " 'by reason of that which made the 
acquisitions unlawful." 429 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added); cf. Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 
U.S. 465 (1982) (group health plan subscriber denied reimbursement for certain medical ex-
penses had antitrust standing to challenge anti-competitive effect of refusal to reimburse). 
In McCready, the Court adopted a two-pronged "test" for antitrust standing: The Court 
looked to the "physical and economic nexus between the alleged [antitrust] violation and the 
harm to the plaintifl'' and then to the "relationship of the injury alleged with those forms of 
injury about which Congress was likely to have been concerned in making defendant's conduct 
unlawful and in providing a private remedy under§ 4." 457 U.S. at 478. The second prong of 
the Court's inquiry is merely an incorporation of the Brunswick test for antitrust injury within 
the framework of antitrust standing analysis. See Case Note, Right to Sue Under Section 4 of 
the Clayton Act - The Employee Discharged for Rejilsal to Participate in Anticompetitive Prac-
tices of his Employer, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 173, 198-99. Prior to McCready, Brunswick had 
been interpreted by some courts to require that plaintiffs prove that their injuries resulted from 
the anticompetitive effect of the alleged violation. See, e.g., Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 
F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). However, the Court announced in 
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this definition, has interpreted the antitrust injury requirement to 
stand for the proposition that treble-damage recoveries should be 
linked both to the pro-competition policy behind the antitrust laws 
in general17 and to the private enforcement goals of section 4 in par-
ticular.18 Where redress of the antitrust plaintiffs injury-in-fact 
would not serve these goals, the Court may refuse to recognize the 
injury as antitrust injury19 and may therefore deny the plaintiff 
standing to maintain a section 4 action. 20 
Mccready that Brunswick "is not so limiting." 457 U.S. at 482. Instead, the Court found it 
sufficient that the plaintiff had charged defendants with a "purposefully anticompetitive 
scheme" and had alleged pecuniary loss "as the consequence of [defendants'] attempt to pur-
sue that scheme." 457 U.S. at 483 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); cf. Comment, 
Employee Standing in Private Antitrust Suits: A New Element in the Balance, 51 U. CtN. L. 
REv. 878, 883 n.41 (1982) (''That a Brunswick analysis should not be considered a limiting 
factor in standing cases was recognized explicitly by the Supreme Court in Mccready.") 
Moreover, the fact that Mccready was not the intended victim of the anticompetitive 
scheme did not prevent her injury from being viewed as antitrust injury. Rather, because she 
had not yielded to the coercive pressure of Blue Shield's selective reimbursement scheme, Mc-
cready had borne directly what had been intended for the competitors of the conspirators. As 
such, her injury "'flow[ed) from that which [made] defendants' acts unlawful' within the 
meaning of Brunswick, and [fell] squarely within the area of congressional concern." 457 U.S. 
at 484 (footnote omitted). McCready's role as a participant qua consumer in the relevant 
economic market - the market for psychotherapeutic services - undoubtedly reinforced the 
Court's assurance that McCready's injury fell within the core concerns that Congress had in 
mind in enacting the antitrust laws. q: Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State 
Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983) (distinguishingMcCreat& from case before Court, 
in which plaintiff-union was neither consumer nor competitor in the relevant market, and had 
failed to allege any marketwide restraint of trade). 
17. Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 482 (1982); see note 16 supra. 
18. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 
405 U.S. 251 (1972). In Hawaii, the Court rejected the state of Hawaii's attempt to sue in its 
parens patriae capacity for harm to its "general economy," caused by a conspiracy among 
private defendants to restrain trade and commerce in petroleum products. 405 U.S. at 260-66. 
The Court emphasized that "(e]ven the most lengthy and expensive trial could not, in the final 
analysis, cope with the problems of double recovery inherent in allowing damages for harm 
both to the economic interests of individuals and for the quasi-sovereign interests of the State." 
405 U.S. at 264. 
In Illinois Brick, the state of Illinois and 700 local governmental entities brought a treble-
damage action for price overcharges paid as a consequence of an alleged price-fixing conspir-
acy among concrete block manufacturers. The Court held that only the overcharged direct 
purchaser, not a "pass-on" customer, is "injured in his business or property" within the mean-
ing of§ 4. 431 U.S. at 728-29; see also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 
U.S. 481 (1968); cf. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473-77 (1982) (characterizing the 
antitrust injury requirement of Hawaii and Illinois Brick as a "duplicative recovery" limitation 
analytically distinct from the "remoteness" or antitrust standing limitation on § 4 recovery). 
19. In Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Court addressed the need for directness of 
injury, particularly in avoiding apportionment of damages. According to the Court, the legis-
lative purpose in creating a group of private attorneys general to enforce the antitrust laws is 
better served by "holding direct purchasers to be injured to the full extent of the overcharge 
paid by them than by attempting to apportion the overcharge among all that may have ab-
sorbed a part ofit." 431 U.S. at 746; cf. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State 
Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 910-13 (1983) (same concerns expressed within general 
analysis of right to seek recovery under § 4). 
20. Although plaintiffs who have not suffered injury "by reason or• an antitrust violation 
necessarily lack standing to maintain a§ 4 action, the converse is not true: Plaintiffs who have 
suffered antitrust injury do not automatically have antitrust standing. See notes 21-24 iefra 
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The antitrust standing requirement further restricts the availabil-
ity of a section 4 remedy, denying it to plaintiffs who may have suf-
fered antitrust injury, but who are nevertheless deemed "too remote" 
from the antitrust violation to seek treble damages.21 Akin to "prox-
imate cause" in the law of torts, the antitrust standing limitation es-
tablishes a point beyond which an antitrust violator is no longer 
liable in treble damages for the antitrust injuries fl.owing from a par-
ticular violation. 22 
Unlike the antitrust injury requirement, the remoteness limita-
tion on section 4 recovery, though derived in attenuated fashion 
from section 4's "by reason of' language, is not mandated by the 
statute.23 Rather, it originates in the lower courts' "virtually unani-
mous" conclusion that "Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to 
and accompanying text. Because a plaintiff cannot maintain a § 4 action if either the antitrust 
injury or the antitrust standing requirement is not met, the distinction between the two require-
ments disappears when one examines the effect of a denial of either. 
21. In Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. 
Ct. 897 (1983), the Court observed: 
The label "antitrust standing" has traditionally been applied to some of the elements of 
this inquiry. As co=entators have observed, the focus of the doctrine of "antitrust 
standing" is somewhat different from that of standing as a constitutional doctrine. Harm 
to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of 
injury in fact, but the court must make a further determination whether the plaintiff is a 
proper party to bring a private antitrust action. 
103 S. Ct. at 907 n.31. 
22. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. 
Ct. 897, 907 (1983) ("There is a similarity between the struggle of co=on-law judges to artic-
ulate a precise definition of the concept of'proximate cause,' and the struggle offederaljudges 
to articulate a precise test to determine whether a party injured by an antitrust violation may 
recover treble damages.") (footnotes omitted). Because antitrust violations, like tortious acts, 
may result in "virtually endless repercussions,'' a sense of fairness and proportionality led 
courts to impose this limitation on§ 4 recovery. See Lytle & Purdue, supra note 3, at 796-802. 
The need for some limitation on antitrust recovery emanates not only from the fact that a 
single violation "may be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow through the Nation's econ-
omy," but also from the potency of the remedy for antitrust injury that Congress fashioned-
a trebling of the actual damages incurred by a single antitrust violation. Because "[i]n the 
absence of direct guidance from Congress, and faced with the claim that a particular injury is 
too remote from the alleged violation to warrant § 4 standing, the courts are . . . forced to 
resort to an analysis no less elusive than that employed traditionally by courts at co=on law 
with respect to the matter of 'proximate cause,' " Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 
(1982) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted), the Court has recently attempted to aid this anal-
ysis. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. 
Ct. 897, 907 n.33 (1983) ("[C]ourts should analyze each situation in light of the factors set forth 
in the text [of Associated General]."). 
23. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 810-11 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in 
original): 
(C]ourts have created an antitrust standing requirement by interpreting the phrase "by 
reason of' to imply not only the fact of causation but also the presence of legal causation. 
In § 4 case law this legal causation requirement, like the proximate cause requirement in 
the law of torts, restricts the scope of a defendant's liability and a plaintiffs right to recov-
ery_ .... [I]ts precise definition[, however,] remains elusive because of the inherent ambi-
guity of the concept of legal causation. 
Because the concept of antitrust standing is ambiguous, and because it derives from the 
same statutory language as the antitrust injury requirement, notions of injury and standing are 
easily confused. Basically, the traditional antitrust standing limitation means that courts do 
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provide a remedy in damages for all [antitrust] injuries that might 
conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation."24 And though con-
sistent with the same pro-competition and private enforcement con-
cerns underlying the Supreme Court's formulation of the antitrust 
injury requirements,25 the standing limitation is more solidly 
grounded in the Court's desire to keep the private scheme managea-
ble, thereby preserving its effectiveness.26 
Ultimately, the analytical distinction between antitrust injury 
and antitrust standing becomes blurred, but the difference between 
the two concepts is not crucial for three reasons. First, the absence 
of either antitrust injury or antitrust standing leads to the same result 
- the antitrust plaintiff is denied the right to maintain a section 4 
action.27 Second, the underlying statutory policy concerns are iden-
tical in both inquiries, although the pro-competition goal may be less 
prominent within the confines of traditional antitrust standing analy-
sis. Third, although the analytical distinction between the two con-
cepts has been recognized by the Supreme Court,28 recent decisions 
indicate that the Court has turned to a single inquiry that incorpo-
rates the two concepts without explicitly differentiating them.29 
B. .Delimiting the Right to Section 4 Recovery 
The Supreme Court has recently examined the limitations on sec-
tion 4 recovery in two very different factual contexts.30 In so doing, 
not accept the argument that Congress actually meant "any" person when it wrote the term 
into§ 4. 
24. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972) (emphasis added). The 
Court has recently gone beyond mere acknowledgment of this implied limitation to express 
approval of the lower courts' attempts to limit§ 4 recovery. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 
Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 907 (1983); Blue Shield v, Mc-
cready, 457 U.S. 465, 477-78 (1982). 
Standing under§ 4 is more carefully scrutinized than standing under§ 16 of the Clayton 
Act, which provides for injunctive relief against ''threatened loss or damage by a violation of 
the antitrust laws" whenever such relief would be granted by courts of equity. 15 U.S.C. § 26 
(1976); see In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 130 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). 
25. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text. 
26. See notes 38 & 63-65 infra and accompanying text. 
27. See note 20supra. 
28. See note 11 supra. 
29. See note 12 supra and Part 1-B infra. Nevertheless, because the two concepts have 
developed independently of each other, a separate jurisprudence exists with respect to each. 
Specifically, the antitrust injury limitation has been shaped largely by the Supreme Court, see 
notes l6-l9supra and accompanying text, while the antitrust standing limitation was originally 
conceived by the lower federal courts, see notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text, and has 
only recently become the focus of Supreme Court guidance. Thus, even under the Court's 
recent unified approval of the right of § 4 recovery, an understanding of the analytical and 
historical distinction between antitrust injury and antitrust standing is necessary to full com-
prehension of the Court's recent decisions in this area. 
30. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S, Ct, 
897 (1983) Qabor union sought § 4 recovery against multi-employer association, alleging that 
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the Court has given the lower courts much needed guidance as to 
when and how to apply these limitations. Part I-B of this Note will 
analyze the Court's recent decisions and delineate the standing con-
siderations which these decisions appear to lay down. 
1. The Statutory Policy Considerations Behind the Limitations on 
the Right to Seek Section 4 Recovery 
In Blue Shield v. McCready 31 the Court held that a consumer of 
psychotherapeutic services had standing to sue for the injury she sus-
tained as a result of the defendants' conspiracy to restrain competi-
tion in the market for such services.32 In Mccready, the Court 
"refused to engraft artificial limitations on the [section] 4 remedy,"33 
and indicated that a plaintiff has standing to sue under section 4 un-
less statutory policy considerations suggest that allowing treble recov-
ery would not properly serve the deterrence and compensation goals 
of the antitrust laws.34 
Examining the plaintiffs antitrust claim in McCready, the Court 
identified the statutory policy considerations behind two distinct, ju-
dicially imposed limitations on the right to seek section 4 recovery.35 
the association had coerced third parties and its own members to do business with nonunion 
firms, thus adversely affecting the trade of unionized firms, thereby restraining the union's 
business activities); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) (group health plan sub-
scriber sought § 4 recovery against health insurer and organization of psychiatrists, alleging an 
unlawful conspiracy to exclude psychologists from receiving compensation under health in-
surer's plans). 
31. 457 U.S. 465 (1982). 
32. Respondent Mccready alleged that petitioners Blue Shield and a psychiatric society 
had conspired to exclude clinical psychologists from participating in a prepaid health plan to 
which she subscribed, in violation of§ I of the Sherman Act. Section I provides, in pertinent 
part, that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to 
be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). To further this conspiracy, Blue Shield allegedly denied 
reimbursement for the services of psychologists unless the treatment was supervised by and 
billed through a physician. When Mccready was denied reimbursement following un-
supervised treatment by a clinical psychologist, she brought a treble damage action challeng-
ing the conspiracy. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that she had standing to 
maintain the § 4 action. 457 U.S. at 484-85. 
33. 457 U.S. at 472. 
34. The Court found that "in the absence of some articulable consideration of statutory 
policy suggesting a contrary conclusion in a particular factual setting, we have applied § 4 in 
accordance with its plain language and its broad remedial and deterrent objectives." 457 U.S. 
at 473 (emphasis added). To illustrate this point, the Court cited Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 
308 (1978) (giving the statutory phrase "any person" its "naturally broad and inclusive mean-
ing" by holding foreign sovereign to be a "person" for§ 4 purposes), and Reiter v. Sonotone 
Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (giving "property" its "naturally broad and inclusive meaning" by 
extending § 4 remedy to consumers injured by increase in purchase price of goods attributable 
to price-fixing conspiracy). 
35. The two limitations - the duplicative recovery limitation and the remoteness limita-
tion - are judicially imposed rather than statutorily mandated. See notes 18-19 supra and 
accompanying text (duplicative recovery limitation); notes 22-24supra and accompanying text 
(antitrust standing limitation as a rough equivalent of remoteness limitation). 
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First, the Court considered the "duplicative recovery" limitation. 
When more than one injured party along a chain of distribution 
claims damages arising from a single antitrust violation, there is nat-
urally cause for concern that multiple plaintiffs might together seek 
damages far in excess of what the statute would normally allow.36 
By recognizing as antitrust injury only the harm to those plaintiffs 
who have been the most directly injured, the Court has sought to 
avoid the potential consequences of allowing multiple section 4 ac-
tions. 37 These consequences - the necessity of complex damages ap-
portionment and the splintering of treble-damage recoveries -
would burden both the courts and potential antitrust plaintiffs and 
would thereby threaten the viability of the private enforcement 
scheme.38 Because there was no risk of duplicative recovery in Mc-
cready, however, the Court found that the private antitrust enforce-
ment concerns behind the duplicative recovery limitation were not 
implicated and declined to apply that limitation.39 
The "remoteness" limitation, the second judicial control dis-
cussed inMcCready,40 is analogous to the traditional antitrust stand-
ing limitation.41 The Court emphasized careful application of the 
36. See 457 U.S. at 474-75; notes 18-19 supra. 
37. See notes 18-19 supra. 
38. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. 
Ct. 897, 912 (1983) ("[M]assive and complex damages litigation not only burdens the courts, 
but also undermines the effectiveness of treble-damages suits."); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 
431 U.S. 720, 737-38 (1977) (attempts to allocate a passed-on overcharge "would add whole 
new dimensions of complexity to treble-damages suits and seriously undermine their effective-
ness"); cf. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968) (defend-
ants not permitted to discount damages claims to the extent that overcharges had been passed 
on to plaintiff's customers because such attempts to fix damages ''would often require addi-
tional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated 
theories"). 
39. 457 U.S. at 475. The Court found that permitting McCready to proceed offered "not 
the slightest possibility of a duplicative exaction from petitioners." Because Mccready had 
paid her bills, the Court reasoned, her psychologist could not "link any claim of injury to 
himself arising from his treatment of Mccready." 457 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added). Worth 
noting, however, is the possibility that McCready's psychologist could have linked a more 
general claim of injury to himself arising from the Blue Shield plan. An action for injunctive 
relief had in fact been brought by an organization of clinical psychologists and an individual 
practitioner against the McCready petitioners and Blue Shield of Southwestern Virginia. Vir-
ginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 469 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1979),revd. 
in part, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). The Court of Appeals 
found no conspiracy between the Blue Shield plans and the neuropsychiatric society, but it did 
find that the plans themselves were "combinations of physicians" capable of conspiring within 
the meaning of§ I of the Sherman Act. 624 F.2d at 479-81, 483. This treatment of the Blue 
Shield plans as combinations rather than distinct entities was apparently accepted by the 
Supreme Court in McCready. See 457 U.S. at 469 n.4. 
40. See 457 U.S. at 476 ("Analytically distinct from the (duplicative recovery limitation], 
there is the conceptually more difficult question 'of which persons have sustained injuries too 
remote [from an antitrust violation] to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4.' ") 
(quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 n.7 (1977)) (emphasis in original). 
41. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text. 
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policies underlying the antitrust laws,42 finding it "reasonable to as-
sume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially 
affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover 
threefold damages for the injury to his business or property."43 Af-
ter focusing first on the "physical and economic" relationship be-
tween the alleged violation and the harm to the plainti.ff,44 and then 
considering whether the harm to this individual was of the type 
about which Congress was concemed,45 the Court in Mccready con-
cluded that the plaintiff's claim satisfied both of these factors.46 The 
42. 457 U.S. at 477 (Although "neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of 
§ 4 offers any focused guidance on the question of which injuries are too remote from the 
violation and the purposes of the antitrust laws to form the predicate for a suit under§ 4[,] ... 
the potency of the remedy implies the need for some care in its application.") (emphasis 
added). 
43. 457 U.S. at 476-77 ("An antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm to 
flow through the Nation's economy; but 'despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a point 
beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.'") (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi-
nois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
44. 457 U.S. at 478-80. This "physical and economic" nexus requirement is most closely 
analogous to the "directness of injury" factor of Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Califor-
nia State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983). See notes 66-67 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
45. 457 U.S. at 481-84. In general, the core concern of Congress in enacting the antitrust 
laws was to enhance competitiou. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
320 (1962) (The core principles behind the enactment of§ 4, in particular, are deterrence and 
compensation; the antitrust laws were enacted for ''the protection of competition, not competi-
tors") (emphasis in original); notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text. 
Thus, the Court's concern here is that standing to seek treble damages be linked to the pro-
competition policy behind the antitrust laws. But this interpretation blurs the analytical dis-
tinction between injury and standing because, as the Court recognized in Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the very existence of antitrust injury turns on 
whether the injury-in-fact resulting from an antitrust violation reflects the pro-competition 
policy of the antitrust laws. See note 16 supra. 
46. Because McCready was the direct victim of defendants' unlawful coercion, and be-
cause she suffered pecuniary loss as a result of her refusal to yield to that coercion, the Court 
found that the requisite physical and economic nexus between the violation and the harm 
existed. In applying the first prong of its remoteness analysis, the Court treated the physical 
and economic nexus separately. Examining the physical nexus, the Court focused on two 
elements. First, the specific intent of the conspirators, to impair psychologists' competitive 
position within the psychotherapeutic market, was not dispositive. The availability of a § 4 
remedy could not reasonably be restricted to the intended victims of the conspiracy, but would 
extend to the foreseeable victims as well. 102 S. Ct. at 2548-49; cf. Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 908 & n.37 (1983) (intent 
allegation is not of controlling importance where plaintiff's attempt to show defendant's spe-
cific intent to harm them, or where defendant, as in Mccready, claims lack of specific intent to 
harm plaintiff as a defense to plaintifrs antitrust claims). Second, because the denial of reim-
bursement to McCready was the "very means" by which Blue Shield allegedly sought to 
achieve its illegal ends, the harm to McCready and her class was "clearly foreseeable,'' and 
precisely the type of harm that the underlying conspiracy would be likely to cause. 457 U.S. at 
479 ( citations omitted). 
Looking to the economic nexus, the Court simply stated that as a consumer of psychother-
apy services and a subscriber to the Blue Shield plan, Mccready was clearly " 'Within that area 
of the economy . . . endangered by [that] breakdown of competitive conditions' resulting from 
Blue Shield's selective refusal to reimburse.'' 457 U.S. at 480-81 (quoting In re Multidistrict 
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Court therefore held that McCready had standing to maintain a sec-
tion 4 action. 
2. Explicit Identification of Factors Relevant to the Right to Seek 
Section 4 Recovery 
In Associated General Contractors of Cal!fornia v. Cal!fornia State 
Council of Carpenters ,47 the Court collapsed the antitrust injury and 
antitrust standing requirements, explicitly identifying factors that are 
relevant to a unified judicial inquiry into a plaintiff's right to seek 
section 4 recovery. At issue was an employee union's standing to 
bring an antitrust action seeking section 4 recovery.48 The Court 
found that the Union was not "a person injured by reason of a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws within the meaning of [section] 4 of the 
Clayton Act."49 
In examining the question of standing, Associated General modi-
fied Mccready by de-emphasizing the facially broad language of 
section 4. so The Court focused instead on the circumstances sur-
rounding the enactment of section 4's statutory predecessor, section 7 
of the Sherman Act.51 The Court found the Sherman Act's legisla-
Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31,481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 
(1973)). 
As to the second prong of the remoteness analysis, the Court reasoned that because Mc-
cready was a consumer of the services that were the target of the alleged conspiracy, her injury 
was clearly within the core of congressional concern in enacting the antitrust laws. The Court, 
then, found it sufficient that the plaintiff had charged the defendant with a "purposefully an• 
ticompelitive scheme" and had alleged pecuniary loss "as the consequence of (dqendant!r) at-
tempt to pursue that scheme." 457 U.S. at 483 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
47. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983). 
48. Plaintiff alleged that the multi-employer association with which it had a collective bar-
gaining agreement had coerced certain third parties to give some - but not necessarily all -
of their business to nonunion firms. 103 S. Ct. at 903. Only this last allegation was an antitrust 
allegation. The two classes of coerced persons encompassed by this antitrust claim were: (I) 
landowners and others who "let" construction contracts; and (2) general contractors. Included 
in the first class were defendants' customers and potential customers, while the second class 
consisted of defendants' competitors and defendants themselves. The Union alleged that de-
fendants' coercive conduct weakened and restrained the trade of certain contractors who re-
fused to submit to defendants' pressure tactics and at the same time caused certain unionized 
subcontractors to lose business from the contractors who did submit to defendants' coercion. 
103 S. Ct. at 903. 
The Union claimed that as a result of this alleged restraint on the market for construction 
contracting and subcontracting, it suffered injury to its "organizational and representational 
activities." 103 S. Ct. at 902. Yet the Union did not allege any restraint on competition in the 
market for labor union services. 103 S. Ct. at 903 n.14 (distinguishing cases where union orga-
nizational and representational activities were held to constitute a form of business protected 
by the antitrust laws because those cases involved claims that competition between rival un-
ions had been injured). 
49. 103 S. Ct. at 913. 
50. See 103 S. Ct. at 904 & n.I 9; note 34 supra. 
51. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209,210 (1890), repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 
283, § 3, 69 Stat. 282, 283. 
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tive history to be filled with "repeated references to the common 
law[,] ... mak[ing] it clear that Congress intended the [Sherman] 
Act to be construed in the light of its common-law background."52 
That background encompassed well-accepted rules circumscribing 
the availability of damages recovery in tort law.53 This common 
law history thus becomes an "articulable consideration of statutory 
policy"54 to be added to those the Court already enumerated in Mc-
Cready as limiting section 4 recovery. As a result, allegations of 
consequential harm, even when supported by an allegation of intent 
to harm the plaintiff, do not end the inquiry into the availability of a 
section 4 right of recovery. 55 Instead, courts must consider three ad-
ditional factors analogous to pertinent common law considerations:56 
(1) the nature of the plaintiffs alleged injury;57 (2) the nature of the 
damages claim;58 and (3) the directness or indirectness of the plain-
tiffs injury.59 
In considering the first factor, the nature of the plaintiffs injury, 
the Court apparently incorporated the antitrust injury requirement 
within its standing analysis.60 Thus, the Court noted that the "cen-
tral interest" of the Sherman Act was to protect the "economic free-
dom of participants in the relevant market."61 Consumers or 
competitors of the relevant product or service fall most clearly within 
the ambit of this interest. 62 
Focusing on the nature of the damages claim, the Court in Asso-
ciated General concerned itself with whatMcCready had labelled the 
52. 103 S. Ct. at 905 (Although the legislative history supports a broad construction of§ 4's 
antecedent, "[a] proper interpretation of the section cannot ... ignore the larger context in 
which the entire statute was debated.") (emphasis added). 
53. The Court's examples of these judge-made rules included the doctrines of (I) foresee-
ability and proximate cause; (2) directness of injury; (3) certainty of damages; and ( 4) privity of 
contract. 103 S. Ct. at 905-06. The Court specifically added the second and third of these 
doctrines to its antitrust framework. See notes 58-67 infra and accompanying text. 
54. Mccready, 451 U.S. at 473; see notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text. 
55. Associated General, 103 S. Ct. at 908. 
56. 103 S. Ct. at 907 ("[A]s was required in common-law damages litigation in 1890, the 
question [whether the Union may recover for injury allegedly suffered by reason of the defen-
dants' actions] requires us to evaluate the plaintifi's harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the de-
fendants, and the relationship between them.") (footnote omitted). 
57. 103 S. Ct. at 908. 
58. 103 S. Ct. at 911. 
59. 103 S. Ct. at 910. 
60. See notes 16 & 45 supra and accompanying text. 
61. 103 S. Ct. at 909 (citingMcCready as precedent for the relevance of this central interest 
in determining the plaintiff's standing to maintain a § 4 action). 
62. 103 S. Ct. at 909. Because the Union in Associated General was neither a consumer nor 
a competitor, and because the Union's longstanding collective bargaining relationship with 
defendants meant that labor market interests dominated the antitrust implications of defen-
dants' conduct, the Court did not consider the injury to the Union to be an antitrust injury. 
103 S. Ct. at 909-10. 
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"duplicative recovery" limitation;63 the Court simply expressed the 
additional requirement that damages claims not be speculative, 
thereby raising what was a footnote inMcCready to textual status.64 
The "statutory policy concern" here is that the effectiveness of the 
private enforcement scheme would be crushed under its own weight 
if the Court were to allow complicated and speculative damage theo-
ries to stand. 65 
The Court's inquiry into the third factor, the directness of the 
injury, also reflects its concern for the effectiveness of private en-
forcement of the antitrust laws. Associated General indicates that 
standing inquiries ought to concentrate on whether a more directly 
injured, identifiable class of putative antitrust plaintiffs exists. 66 If 
such a class of persons ''whose self-interest would normally motivate 
them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement" does 
exist, the justification for allowing a more remotely injured party to 
perform the role of private attorney general is greatly diminished. 67 
Applying all three factors to the facts of Associated General, the 
Court concluded that the Union did not have standing to seek sec-
tion 4 recovery.68 The question remains whether Associated Gen-
63. This is basically an antitrust injury inquiry. 
64. The Court noted in Associated General that "nothing but speculation informs the 
Union's claim of injury by reason of the alleged unlawful coercion. Yet, as we have recently 
reiterated, it is appropriate for § 4 purposes 'to consider whether a claim rests at bottom on 
some abstract conception or speculative measure of harm.'" 103 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting Mc-
Crea,&, 451 U.S. at 475 n.Il);seealso Case Note,supra note 16, at 183-84, 194-95 (treating the 
feasibility of implementing certain damage theories as a third prong of the Mccready 
analysis). 
65. The Court emphasized the "strong interest ... in keeping the scope of complex anti• 
trust trials within judicially manageable limits." 103 S. Ct. at 911 (footnote omitted). This 
interest underlies "the importance of avoiding either the risk of duplicate recoveries on the one 
hand, or the danger of complex apportionment of damages on the other." 103 S. Ct. at 912; see 
notes 18 & 36-38 supra and accompanying text. 
66. 103 S. Ct. at 911. 
67. 103 S. Ct. at 911. This third factor is analogous to traditional antitrust standing analy-
sis, and to the "remoteness" inquiry in McCrea,&. See 451 U.S. at 476-84. Where such a 
directly injured class exists, denying the more remote party a remedy "is not likely to leave a 
significant antitrust violation undetected or unremedied." Associated General, 103 S. Ct. at 
911; see also notes 18-19 supra. 
68. Applying the second and third factors to Associated General itself, the Court first found 
that the Union's injury was merely derivative. The Court noted: 
If the Union claims that dues payments were adversely affected because employees 
had less incentive to join the Union in light of expanding nonunion job opportunities, its 
damage is more remote than the harm allegedly suffered by unionized subcontractors. 
The same is true if the Union contends that revenues from dues payments declined be-
cause its members lost jobs or wages because their unionized employers lost business. 
That harm, moreover, is even more indirect than the already indirect injury to its mem-
bers, yet a number of decisions have denied standing to employees with merely derivative 
injuries. 
103 S. Ct. at 910 n.46 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). There was, indeed, "no allegation 
that the Union's revenues in the form of dues or initiation fees" had decreased. 103 S. Ct. at 
911. Rather, any injury to the Union was "only an indirect result" of whatever harm may have 
been suffered by certain contractors and subcontractors - by those who refused to yield to the 
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eral's three-factor approach allows a discharged employee to 
maintain a section 4 cause of action. 
II. THE DISCHARGED EMPLOYEE'S STANDING TO SEEK 
RECOVERY UNDER SECTION 4 
Together, McCready and Associated General demonstrate the 
Court's desire to go beyond labels in the antitrust context, and to 
examine instead the policy considerations that affect antitrust stand-
ing. After describing the context in which ·employee standing cases 
arise, Part II of this Note argues that the factual context and policy 
concerns peculiar to these cases weigh heavily in favor of granting 
antitrust standing to discharged employees. 
A. Employee Standing: The Factual Context 
The very context of employee standing requires explanation, be-
cause employees will attempt to maintain section 4 actions in vary-
ing capacities. For example, employees may allege derivative injury 
flowing from a business weakened by an anticompetitive scheme.69 
They may also allege more direct injury resulting from a concerted 
refusal to deal aimed directly at them and at the employment market 
of which they are a part.70 Generally, employees are denied antitrust 
standing in the former case,71 and granted it in the latter.72 
defendants' coercive practices and who thereby lost business to nonunion firms, and by those 
union firms that lost business when contractors or subcontractors yielded to defendants' coer-
cive practice by diverting contracts to nonunion firms. 103 S. Ct. at 910 & n.46. Because the 
more immediate victims of the defendants' coercion would be able to maintain a treble dam-
age action against defendants, 103 S. Ct. at 911, and because of the speculative and duplicative 
nature of the Union's damages claim, the Court concluded that the second and third factors of 
its analysis, together with the nature of the Union's injury, ''weigh[ed] heavily against judicial 
enforcement of the Union's antitrust claim." 103 S. Ct. at 913. 
69. The primary injury in these cases is felt by the employer, in the form of lost business 
resulting from the anticompetitive effects of an antitrust violation. When the employer reacts 
to this loss by terminating employees, or when employees receive diminished salary or com-
missions as a result of the employer's weakened market position, these employees suffer deriva-
tive injury only. 
70. The Supreme Court has long permitted those targeted by such a concerted refusal to 
deal to challenge the larger conspiracy of which the restraint on competition in the labor mar-
ket is but a part. For example, in Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), 
the plaintiff football player alleged that pursuant to a conspiracy among the defendants to 
monopolize professional football in the United States, he had been boycotted and blacklisted 
for having played for a professional football league that competed with the defendant's league. 
The Court allowed the plaintiff to challenge the primary conspiracy to monopolize profes-
sional football of which the employee boycott was a part. . ' · 
71. See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 
U.S. 938 (1973) (employee lacked antitrust standing to seek recovery for termination resulting 
from employer's illegal merger); Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Okla. 
1971) (same); Bywater v. Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1971 Trade Cas. ,i 73,759 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971) (employees and their union had no standing to seek§ 4 recovery where employer was 
directly affected by Japanese television manufacturers' conspiracy to undersell American 
competitors). 
72. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional 
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In the category of employee standing cases with which this Note 
is concerned, the employee lies somewhere between these two ex-
tremes.73 The paradigm of the aggrieved employee with which this 
Note deals is the whistleblower - the employee who refuses to co-
operate with his employer's antitrust violating scheme, often in a not 
so quiet way, and who therefore suffers the consequence of 
termination. 
The violative schemes in these cases are usually horizontal con-
spiracies among a group of similarly situated employers to fix prices, 
rig bids, or allocate markets.74 Often, the noncooperating employee 
occupies an at-will sales or managerial position that renders his ac-
tive participation in any such horizontal conspiracy essential to its 
success.75 An examination of the elements of standing set forth in 
Associated General indicates that an employee in this situation has 
standing to seek treble damages under section 4. 
B. Assessing the Statutory Policy Considerations 
I. The Nature of the Employee's Injury 
Employees who are discharged for refusing to carry out their em-
ployer's antitrust violating scheme suffer pecuniary loss76 as a direct 
football player had standing to challenge blacklisting by defendant league); Quinonez v. Na-
tional Assn. of Sec. Dealers 540 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff securities sales representa• 
tive who was the victim of defendant's blackball exclusionary practices had standing to sue); 
Nichols v. Spencer Intl. Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967) (former employee of defen-
dant had standing to challenge "no switching" agreement entered into between defendant and 
other firm in industry); Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (former 
division managerial employee had standing to sue for loss of employment opportunity, where 
there was agreement between buyer and seller of corporate division that seller would not re-
hire former managerial employees who refused employment with buyer); Drysdale v. Florida 
Team Tennis, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (tennis player had standing to sue for 
injuries resulting from defendant's restrictive draft system); Freeman v. Eastman-Whipstock, 
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (employee had standing to sue where he alleged that 
former employers had conspired to prevent his employment in oil well surveying industry and 
had power to enforce conspiratorial decision). 
73. That is, the employee is not alleging mere derivative injury, nor is he necessarily alleg-
ing a concerted refusal to deal aimed at restricting competition in the employment market. 
74. See cases cited at note 7 supra. Horizontal conspiracies violate § I of the Sherman Act. 
See note 25 supra. 
75. See, e.g., Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. 
Ct. 1261 (1983) (corporate president); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 
1982), vacated and remanded mem., 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983) (market director); McNulty v. Bor• 
den, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (unit sales manager); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 
541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (sales managers). But see Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 
Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (truckdriver). In fact, an employee's mere noncoopera-
tion may seem threatening to the employer, for his refusal to participate leaves him with clean 
hands, and his knowledge of the conspiracy gives him ample weaponry with which to attack 
the employer ifhe becomes disgruntled or ifhe is terminated -whether for antitrust related 
reasons or for reasons unrelated to the purposes of the antitrust laws. 
76. See, e.g., Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1976) 
("There can be little doubt that an employee who is deprived of a work opportunity has been 
injured in his 'commercial interests or enterprise,' because the selling of one's labor is a com-
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consequence of their refusal to cooperate with the unlawful action. 
Whether this pecuniary loss is cognizable under section 4 depends on 
the characterization of the employee's role in the relevant market.77 
Although an employee, like the Union in Associated General, is 
neither a consumer nor a competitor with respect to targeted goods 
or services, an employee resembles a consumer because he partici-
pates in the relevant market insofar as his cooperation or noncooper-
ation with an illegal scheme affects that market. By cooperating with 
such a plan, an employee helps to effectuate a restraint on the market 
for his employer's goods; by refusing to cooperate, however, the 
same employee can thwart the scheme.78 Furthermore, to the extent 
that the employee alleges a post-discharge boycott of his services 
among all the employer-conspirators, the boycott affects the market 
for an employee's services .79 The shunned employee is a crucial par-
ticipant in this market and is clearly injured by a boycott. 80 
The central concern of the antitrust laws - protecting the eco-
nomic freedom of participants in the relevant market - may well 
extend to protecting the entrepreneurial freedom of some employees. 
Discharged employees whose jobs involve the exercise of economic 
discretion and who rely on the ability to compete in an unfettered 
market suffer a distinct injury of the type contemplated by the 
Supreme Court. Unlike the Union's interest inAssociated General,81 
the typical employee's interests are clearly disserved by diminished 
competition. Because sales and managerial employees often depend 
on commissions and bonuses to supplement their salaries, and be-
cause the size of commissions or bonuses could be reduced by a 
mercial interest."); Nichols v. Spencer Intl. Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967) (loss 
of employment as sales supervisor) ("(W]e readily conclude that one who has been damaged 
by loss of employment as a result of a violation of the antitrust laws is 'injured in his business 
or property' and thus entitled to recovery under [§ 4 of Clayton Act] ... [since] the interest 
invaded by a wrongful act resulting in loss of employment is so closely akin to the interest 
invaded by impairment of one's business as to be indistinguishable in this context."); accord 
Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1967) (termination of employ-
ment as sales supervisor); Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491 (2d 
Cir. 1948) (loss of employment as advertising solicitor); Broyer v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. 
Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (termination of employment as territory sales manager and 
concomitant loss of commissions and bonuses); Kinzler v. New York Stock Exch., 62 F.R.D. 
196, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (loss of accounts resulting from freeze on employment of failing 
broker's registered representatives is injury to business or property within meaning of § 4); 
Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Assn., 344 F. Supp. ll8, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 
(salary or commissions lost as a result of antitrust violations recoverable as damages). 
11. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text. 
18. See note 97 i'!(ra (noncooperative employee serves as prime government source in 
criminal antitrust prosecution). 
79. q. Associated General, 103 S. Ct. at 903 n.14 (dictum implying that Union might have 
had § 4 claim if it had alleged direct restraint in the market for labor union services). 
80. See notes 70 & 72 supra. 
81. See Associated General, 103 S. Ct. at 909 ("It is not clear whether the Union's interests 
would be served or disserved by enhanced competition in the market."). 
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rigged market, these employees have a direct interest in protecting 
that market's integrity. Moreover, because at-will employees are not 
covered by a separate body of federal labor law,82 the employees' 
antitrust concerns predominate, and allowing employees to air these 
concerns in a judicial forum is consistent with the pro-competitive 
thrust of the antitrust laws.83 
2. The Nature of the Damages Claim 
Neither the "duplicative recovery" nor the "speculative dam-
ages" concerns discussed in Associated General are warranted in the 
employee discharge context. First, the duplicative recovery problem 
does not arise because the employee suffers a discrete injury that is 
easily distinguishable from any harm suffered by consumers or com-
petitors in the relevant market. Because the claims of consumers, 
competitors, and employees would not intermingle, there would be 
no need to apportion damages. 84 
Second, the discharged employee's damages claim is not the least 
bit speculative.85 The employee's injury is direct, its nature precise. 
82. See Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust JJischarge: The Need for a Federal 
Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319, 319 n.4 (1983) ("The United States stands almost alone 
among democratic industrialized nations in not providing legal protection against unjust dis-
charge for all wage-earning and salaried employees."). As a result, "(s]ome fifty-nine million 
private sector employees remain unprotected against arbitrary and possibly unfair disciplinary 
penalties, including discharge, that may be imposed unilaterally by employers for unaccept• 
able behavior." Id. at 322. 
At-will employees must usually content themselves with whatever state tort remedies are 
available. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal, 
Rptr. 839 (1980) (employee who alleged that he was discharged for refusing to participate in an 
illegal price fixing scheme was allowed to bring a wrongful discharge tort action against his 
employer). State remedies are, however, inadequate for two reasons. First, most states con-
tinue to recognize the employment-at-will doctrine, which holds that an oral contract under 
which an employee offers only his labor as consideration is terminable at, the will of either 
party. As a result, state remedies generally do not protect employees against arbitrary dis-
charge. See Stieber & Murray, supra, at 321-22 & n.23; Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower 
from Retaliatory IJischarge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277, 280 (1983) ("In jurisdictions strictly 
adhering to the employment-at-will doctrine, the discharged whistleblower has no remedy.") 
(footnote omitted). Second, "[e]ffective enforcement of federal antitrust laws cannot be made 
to depend upon the availability of alternate remedies under varying local laws." Ostrofe v. 
H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1384 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded mem., 103 S. 
Ct 1244 (1983). Section 4 demands a more reliable way to deter conspiring employers, as well 
as a more certain remedy for wrongfully discharged employees. 
83. The employee's complaint thus comes within the Brunswick test for antitrust injury. 
See note 16 supra and accompanying text. 
84. Because employees are not within the same chain of distribution as either the competi-
tors of the conspirators, or the consumers of the targeted goods or services, the duplicative 
recovery concern is absent in the employee discharge context. See Case Note, supra note 16, at 
193-94. 
85. q: McCready Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982): 
If there is a subordinate theme to our opinions in Hawaii and Illinois Brick, it is that the 
feasibility and consequences of implementing particular damages theories may, in certain 
limited circumstances, be considered in determining who is entitled to prosecute an action 
brought under § 4. Where consistent with the broader remedial purposes of the antitrust 
laws, we have sought to avoid burdening § 4 actions with damages issues giving rise to the 
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Courts are thoroughly familiar with wrongful termination actions; 
damages awards are neither difficult to ascertain86 nor frighteningly 
large.87 Finally, unlike the situation in Associated General, the em-
ployee discharge situation does not implicate a competing body of 
substantive law that could dominate the antitrust concerns raised by 
the employer's antitrust violating behavior.88 
need for "massive evidence and complicated theories," where the consequences would be 
to discourage vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws by private suits. 
457 U.S. at 475 n.11 (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 
493 (1968)). 
86. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and 
remanded mem., 103 S. Ct 1244 (1983) ("Suits for damages by persons wrongfully discharged 
are common; courts are accustomed to assessing such damages; they are neither unduly specu-
lative nor difficult to calculate . . • ."). Thus, an employee's claim, ''while perhaps not ascer-
tainable to the penny, as was McCready's claim, certainly involve[s) none of the 'massive 
evidence and complicated theories' required in typical antitrust actions." Case Note, supra 
note 16, at 195 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 475 n.11). 
87. Courts are wary of the possible anticompetitive effects of imposing treble-damage lia-
bility because extremely high damage awards can severely injure a defendant. See Note, Class 
Actions for Punitive Damages, 81 MrcH .. L. R.E.v. -, - - - (1983) (bankruptcy caused by 
punitive damage awards). Courts will not want to bury an individual defendant with antitrust 
damages where the loss of that defendant would appreciably lessen competition within the 
affected market Yet treble-damage awards to discharged employees are unlikely to produce 
the level of damages that might be generated in a McCready class-action setting. See Case 
Note, supra note 16, at 194 ("Given [the employee's) relatively small potential recovery, lost 
wages and bonuses trebled, it is unlikely that such a recovery would ruin" the employer or the 
employer's co-conspirators.). Concern about removing a defendant from the market, thus pro-
ducing a concomitant reduction of competition in the affected industry, is largely absent in the 
employee discharge situation. 
For an excellent discussion of the policy against overkill liability, see Berger & Bernstein, 
supra note 3, at 851-52, 868. Berger and Bernstein explain that the policy against ruinous 
recoveries comes into play when "discrete injuries are so numerous that nonduplicative treble 
damages recoveries for all of them would heavily burden, or perhaps even bankrupt, one or 
more defendants." Id. at 851 (emphasis added). The concern is with the total impact of these 
discrete awards, and is justified only where it accords with the substantive principles of the 
antitrust laws. Where no anticompetitive effects are likely, however, "concern over the extent 
of an antitrust defendant's total liability represents no more than unwarranted solicitude for 
the alleged antitrust violator." Id. at 852. The authors caution that "an overkill defense can-
not be permitted to prevail in antitrust standing decisions when great market power causes 
numerous simultaneous injuries, lest a defendant be effectively shielded from liability because 
of the outrageous scope of his own misconduct." Such a result, they maintain, would contra-
dict both the deterrent and remedial objectives of the antitrust laws. Id. at 868; see also Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344-45 (1979) (fear that standing will have potentially ruin-
ous effects on small businesses is not an unimportant consideration, but is one more properly 
addressed by Congress than by the judiciary). 
88. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 
897, 909-10 (1983). Because of the existence of a broad labor exemption from the antitrust 
laws and a separate body of labor law specifically designed to protect and promote the "orga-
nizational and representational activities of labor unions," the Court in Associated General 
noted that "a union, in its capacity as bargaining representative, will frequently not be part of 
the class the Sherman Act was designed to protect, especially in disputes with employers with 
whom it bargains." 103 S. Ct. at 910 (emphasis added);see also notes 53-54supra. In contrast, 
most individual employees are not protected by a separate body of law. See note 82supra and 
accompanying text. 
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3. The .Directness of the Employee's Injury 
In addition to the nature of the employee's injury, courts must 
examine the directness of that injury. The situation examined in this 
Note involves direct coercion by an employer attempting to control 
individual behavior. An employee's refusal to succumb to this coer-
cion usually leads to retaliatory discharge, 89 and he suffers pecuniary 
injury as a result.90 To be sure, the employee is not the intended tar-
get of the antitrust conspiracy;91 he is merely an instrument used to 
carry out the conspiracy. Only when he declines this assigned role is 
the employee subjected to whatever economic sanctions his em-
ployer may wish to visit upon him. 
In all these particulars the employee is akin to the uncooperative 
contracting and subcontracting firms in Associated General. Those 
firms also refused to yield to the defendants' coercive practices and 
were therefore subjected to the defendants' retaliatory economic 
sanctions.92 The Court declared in that case that such firms could 
maintain section 4 actions against the defendants, because they were 
both participants in the relevant market and the direct victims of the 
defendants' coercive practices.93 The discharged employee appears 
to fall within this dictum as well. 
Behind this rather mechanistic application of Associated General, 
however, lie even stronger reasons to find that employees are directly 
injured persons within the meaning of that case. First, discharged 
employees are a directly injured, identifiable class of persons whose 
self-interest could easily motivate them to vindicate the public inter-
est in antitrust enf orcement.94 Granting a section 4 right of action to 
these employees would give them a powerful incentive to refuse par-
ticipation in unlawful schemes. Knowledge of this incentive, and 
fear of the treble-damage consequences of terminating recalcitrant 
employees, might deter employers from even pursuing conspiracies 
that require the knowledge and participation of several employees.95 
89. Retaliatory discharge may be preceded by a variety of less drastic coercive measures 
that are intended to preserve the conspiracy by forcing the employee to capitulate. See, e.g., 
Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (plaintiffs alleged reduced 
compensation, inability to add new customers, reduction in potential for advancement, dimi-
nution of professional reputation and integrity, and ultimate loss of jobs). 
90. See note 76supra. 
91. q: notes 16 & 46 supra. 
92. See note 58 supra. 
93. See notes 46 & 68 supra and accompanying text. 
94. See Case Note, supra note 16, at 192; note 97 infra and accompanying text; cf. note 67 
supra and accompanying text. 
95. An uncooperative employee leaves the employer with few options. The employer can 
(I) discharge the employee and run the risk of a § 4 action; (2) allow the employee to interfere 
with the conspiracy, thus reducing its effectiveness; (3) buy the employee's acquiescence, as-
suming that the employee has few principles; (4) abandon the illegal practice. See Case Note, 
supra note 16, at 192. Unless the employer has reason to believe that an employee can main-
August 1983] Note-Employee Antitrust Standing 1865 
Second, if the treble-damage remedy failed to deter an employer, the 
employee qua insider would nevertheless be in the best position to 
blow the whistle on a covert conspiracy before it could wreak major 
competitive damage.96 Finally, detection at any stage means that 
section 4 would be serving its private enforcement purpose. Such 
private enforcement is especially meaningful in the context of covert 
horizontal conspiracies, which often require some supervision even 
after detection and prosecution in order to prevent their 
reappearance.97 
tain a § 4 action, his least costly alternative is to discharge the employee. This result eliminates 
the deterrent effect of choices 2 and 3, both of which increase the costs involved in pursuing the 
illegal activity. 
Of course, because of the risk that an employee might help in a criminal prosecution, see 
note 97 infra, the employer might still abandon the conspiracy. In this sense, the mere presence 
of an uncooperative employee, regardless of his ability to sue, might deter the employer. Thus, 
one could argue that permitting an employee to seek§ 4 recovery will not provide a unique 
deterrent against employer wrongdoing. 
At a minimum, however, allowance of standing would increase deterrence by reducing the 
risks that an employee must contemplate before refusing to go along with an illegal scheme. 
Because alternative remedies are limited, see note 82 supra, an employee will probably be 
unable to recover damages if he is discharged for interfering with his employer's illegal activi-
ties. The financial risks involved might produce acquiescence in an employee who would 
otherwise help to enforce the law. The availability of remedies gives the objecting employee 
the security he needs to follow his conscience, and thus encourages greater public detection of 
activities that violate the antitrust laws. See note 97 infra. In addition, awareness that employ-
ees have nothing to lose by enforcing the law would discourage employer initiation of illegal 
activities. 
96. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Avoiding 
injury to the competitive structure itself is particularly important [because] once destroyed, 
competitive conditions may be difficult to restore.") (citation omitted), vacated and remanded 
mem., 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Case Note, supra note 16, at 197 ("Since conspiracies involving 
price-fixing and allocation of customers have numerous victims, the number of resulting plain-
tiffs may well be decreased if the conspiracies are halted at an early stage through employee 
suits ..•. [T]he extent of harm will [also] be diminished."). Thus, despite judicial assertions 
that discharged employees are not "efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws," Bichan v. Cheme-
tron Corp., 681 F.2d 514,520 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983), allowing such 
plaintiffs to seek § 4 recovery would improve efficient enforcement of those laws by preempting 
the worst anti-competitive effects of a given violation. 
97. The detection rate of antitrust violations is admittedly much lower than that of other 
crimes because antitrust violations are usually concealed and because " 'there is rarely an 
identifiable victim who is aware of the violation.' " Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 847 
n.172 (quoting statement of former Assistant Attorney General Donald Baker before the Tenth 
New England Antitrust Conference, Nov. 20, 1976) (emphasis added). 
The history of the paper label industry serves as one example of the critical role of private 
detection of antitrust violations. That industry has been the target of several price-fixing in-
dictments beginning in the late 1930s and ending with civil and criminal antitrust actions filed 
against nine paper label companies by the Department of Justice in March, 1974. H.S. Crocker 
Co. was one of those nine companies. Eight executives of these companies, including Robert J. 
Rodgers, president of H.S. Crocker Co., pleaded no contest to the criminal charges of price 
fixing, and were fined and ordered to make speeches before public and business groups. A 
year later one executive claimed, "Price-fixing in this industry can't ever be truly stopped. . . . 
I'm not going to do it again, but I'm inclined to believe it will go on. I'm even betting it's going 
on right now." Public 'sermons' by accused executives, Bus. WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 45. This 
last government investigation of the paper label industry was triggered when a "disgruntled 
former employee" tipped off a customer. Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 
86 YALE L. J. 590, 591 (1977). This disgruntled former employee was Frank J. Ostrofe, plain-
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CONCLUSION 
In McCready, the Court appeared to instruct lower courts to rec-
ognize a more expansive section 4 cause of action unless some "ar-
ticulable consideration of statutory policy" admonishes otherwise. 
InAssociated General, the Court retreated a bit, enough to warn the 
courts that they must not forget the common-law limitations on the 
section 4 cause of action, and that they must not allow any one statu-
tory policy consideration - particularly, the private antitrust en-
forcement goal of section 4 - to self-destruct under its own 
complexity. 
The Court's competing concerns can be harmonized in the em-
ployee discharge context. First, treble-damage recovery for the dis-
charged employee is consistent with the pro-competitive thrust of the 
antitrust laws. Second, conferring antitrust standing on the dis-
charged employee furthers the compensation, deterrence, and pri-
vate antitrust enforcement goals of section 4. No one of these goals is 
sacrificed to another; and the private antitrust enforcement scheme is 
not overburdened by speculative, impractical, or complex damages 
claims. Third, common-law limitations do not limit standing where 
the employee is the direct victim of the defendant's coercive scheme. 
In short, the statutory policy considerations weigh heavily in favor of 
judicial enforcement of the discharged employee's antitrust claim. 
tiff in Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded mem., 
103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). He became the government's chief witness in their criminal investiga-
tion of price fixing in the paper label industry. Employees discharged for refusing to go along 
with an anti-competitive scheme can therefore be quite important in enforcing the law; they 
should not be denied the right to seek a remedy for the injuries they receive as a result of their 
refusal to cooperate. See Case Note, supra note 16, at 191-92; note 95 supra. But see Malin, 
supra note 82, at 278 ("[A]lthough the law should protect individual acts of whistleblowing 
once they have occurred, it should not affirmatively encourage whistleblowing."). 
